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Disadvantageous associations: 
Reversible spatial cueing effects in 
a discrimination task
Daniele Nico1 & Elena Daprati2,3
Current theories describe learning in terms of cognitive or associative mechanisms. To assess whether 
cognitive mechanisms interact with automaticity of associative processes we devised a shape-
discrimination task in which participants received both explicit instructions and implicit information. 
Instructions further allowed for the inference that a first event would precede the target. Albeit 
irrelevant to respond, this event acted as response prime and implicit spatial cue (i.e. it predicted 
target location). To modulate cognitive involvement, in three experiments we manipulated modality 
and salience of the spatial cue. Results always showed evidence for a priming effect, confirming that 
the first stimulus was never ignored. More importantly, although participants failed to consciously 
recognize the association, responses to spatially cued trials became either slower or faster depending 
on salience of the first event. These findings provide an empirical demonstration that cognitive and 
associative learning mechanisms functionally co-exist and interact to regulate behaviour.
A good rule to sell a product for a considerable period of time is to create a recognizable pattern for the 
brand and stick to it. Nowadays, a red can with a white wave shouts the name of a famous soft drink 
to billions of people, and two golden arches invariably make one think of hamburgers and French fries. 
Although not necessarily privy to the neural mechanisms involved, the marketing industry has long been 
aware of the strong associative powers of the human brain. Colour patterns, for example, are known to 
convey information that automatically refers to a brand’s name, making it readily recognizable1,2.
In fact, since it was theorized that animals might learn automatically3, interest in implicit forms of 
learning has flourished.
Associative learning is commonly described as a form of learning that takes place whenever a rela-
tionship is detected between certain elements in the organism’s environment (such as a cue and an out-
come) or between a stimulus and a given behaviour. In this view, previously experienced stimuli readily 
activate the information with which they have been associated. Computationally, this sort of automatic 
mechanism is clearly advantageous. For example, in the case of visual perception, stimuli that are deemed 
to be constant need not be repeatedly processed, thus reducing the brain’s workload. Similarly, making 
predictions based on previous experience sharpens perceptual abilities: in the case of ambiguous inputs, 
information gained in previous encounters can provide useful cues4. More generally, the human brain is 
extremely sensitive to regularities in the external world. This ability emerges early in the development, 
with infants as young as three months old engaging in probability matching to maximize their chances 
of detecting a target5. Besides, the tendency to seek for patterns in external events is so deeply rooted in 
brain functioning that individuals report having detected regularities in perfectly random sequences6 or 
assume the existence of patterns even when this presumption negatively affects their choices7,8.
Along these lines, it has been suggested that some “affective tag” is created between information that 
can be predicted and a positive reward9. Namely, individuals seem to actually “prefer” predictable infor-
mation. In a recent study10, participants performed a visual search task in which target location could 
be/could not be predicted by the position of the presented distractors. Interestingly, when asked about 
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goodness of the displays participants preferred the (easier) predictive ones. More directly, in a controlled 
study, Trapp and co-workers demonstrated that people attribute a positive value to associative informa-
tion compared to information that has no or weak associations, even when no apparent benefit emerges9. 
As nicely stated by these authors, “the predictive brain likes things that promote predictions” (p.10). In 
this view, associative information can be easily described as a precursor of predictive processes in that it 
minimizes surprise and allows speeding up analysis of incoming inputs.
An interesting aspect of these experiments is that participants are usually unaware of the reasons why 
they select (or prefer) a given item. In fact, when associative learning is considered, conscious aware-
ness of the underlying link, or rule, is deemed unnecessary and learning is assumed to proceed entirely 
unaware. For instance, in the serial response time (SRT) task11,12, participants press a button in response 
to a visual target that appears in one of four possible locations. Unbeknownst to them, order of target 
presentation follows a precise (but hidden) rule. By the end of the task, participants are unable to report 
whether a sequence exists in target presentation. Nevertheless, their response times show that the rule 
has, in fact, been learnt. A similar pattern is found when regularities involve the temporal association 
between two visual events: although participants remain unaware of it, different attentional operations 
are selectively applied according to the detected contingencies13, suggesting that conscious perception of 
regularities in the environment is not necessary for the brain to detect (and apply) them.
Alongside the large body of evidence in favour of forms of implicit learning, a number of cognitive 
theories have been developed, which mainly describe learning in terms of propositional reasoning and 
hypothesis testing: namely, by assuming that the link between a cue and an outcome relies on acquisi-
tion of a belief about their relationship. A recent review14 suggests that awareness is in fact part of the 
learning mechanism across a variety of conditions, reviving the hypothesis that – in humans – controlled 
processes play a role also in associative learning15. In support of this idea, it is assumed that, accordingly 
to how it is probed, a certain degree of conscious knowledge exists for most implicitly learnt informa-
tion (including SRT tasks): several studies indicate that, if tested by free-generation or recognition tasks, 
implicitly learnt sequences can, in fact, be accessed by participants16,17.
To account for these contrasting findings, it has recently been hypothesized that a more general dis-
tinction could be made between associative and cognitive processes, wherein the former refers to the 
construction of links between representations, the latter to the creation and application of rules in a 
flexible manner18. Executive control would here represent the best example of propositional processing. 
In this dual view, associative and cognitive processes are expected to co-exist, the former mechanism pre-
sumably being at work even when more controlled processes are running. This position further suggests 
that interactions might exist between the two learning modes: specifically, the expression of associative 
processes might be affected by the degree of involvement of cognitive control exerted on the task18.
To directly explore this interaction, we devised a shape-discrimination task, in which participants 
received explicit and implicit task-relevant information. The explicit instruction was to press one of two 
keys in response to a target shape. The target was always preceded by a first event, which – unbeknownst 
to participants – conveyed implicit information (Fig. 1). Structure of the task, and the explicit rule, fur-
ther provided ambiguous information about the first event that was only incidentally defined as a distrac-
tor: participants were explicitly told to respond to the second event, thus implying something preceding 
it. To assess the interaction between cognitive and associative processes, the first event was given the 
double role of prime and spatial cue: namely, its shape was one of the possible forms of the target, i.e. it 
was relevant according to the explicit rule (prime), while one of its features was implicitly associated to 
the location where the target would appear (cue). The prime, by automatically triggering a response code, 
ensured engagement of the cognitive system in each trial19–21. Besides, as no definite instruction con-
cerning the first stimulus was given, overt search for a rule justifying its role could be expected. In line 
with the hypothesis that associative processes and cognitive control interact18 we predicted a reciprocal 
modulation of priming and spatial cuing effects. In addition, if interacting implies permeability between 
the two systems, some information sharing could be anticipated. Accordingly, detecting and using an 
implicit association could contribute to the creation of a representation that might lead, at least in some 
participants, to overt report of the recognized rule.
Experiment 1
Results. Sixteen participants (mean age 23.06 ± 1.53yrs) performed the task summarized in Fig.  1. 
Two successive shapes appeared on a computer screen: the first in the centre, the second in one of two 
lateral boxes. Participants were explicitly asked to respond on the shape of the second stimulus (“Is it a 
club (heart, spade)?”). Unbeknown to them, colour of the first shape cued the box where the target would 
appear. There were three colours, two cueing for either lateral box, one favouring none (see Fig.  2a). 
Manual RTs for correct responses were recorded and analysed.
A summary of results is given in Table 1. ‘Cued’ trials (523 ± 6.7 ms) were significantly slower than 
‘uncued’ trials (492 ± 8.9 ms), F(1,15) = 18.96, p = .0006, η p2 = .56. ‘No’ (504 ± 7.04 ms) and ‘yes’ responses 
(511 ± 7.24 ms) did not differ, F(1,15) = 4.19, p > .05, η p2 = .22. RTs in ‘congruent’ trials (i.e. when shape 
of the first event was identical to that of the target) (342 ± 7.8 ms) were smaller than those in ‘incongru-
ent’ trials (673 ± 15.7 ms), F(1,15) = 261.42, p = .0000001, η p2 = .95. Two interactions were significant: 
Congruency X Cueing, F(1,15) = 12.12, p = .003, η p2 = .45; Congruency X Response, F(1,15) = 27.89, 
p = .05, η p2 = .65. Both are summarized in Fig. 2b. The difference between ‘uncued’ and ‘cued’ trials was 
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larger in the ‘congruent’ than in the ‘incongruent’ condition. In addition, in the ‘congruent’ condition, 
‘yes’ responses (335 ± 8.61 ms) were faster than ‘no’ responses (349 ± 7.96 ms). The opposite emerged in 
the ‘incongruent’ condition (‘no’ 659 ± 15.47 ms;‘yes’ 686 ± 16.15 ms;) (see Table 1).
In a debriefing session, none of the participants spontaneously reported to have detected the predic-
tive nature of the first event. When asked about the possible role of the first stimulus, they claimed it 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the trial events in the three experiments. The timeline runs from 
left to right. Duration of each event is reported on the upper left of each screen representation. Each trial 
started with a fixation cross, and ended with a view of the empty box triplet. In A is represented the event 
corresponding to the first stimulus; the musical note depicts either the tone pitch used in Exp.2 or the 
neutral tone of Exp.3, which was delivered simultaneously with first stimulus’ onset. In Exp.1 no sound was 
presented and the box including the target (B) was cued through the colour of the first stimulus as in Exp. 3 
(see Methods for details).
Figure 2. (a) In Exp. 1, in cued trials the colour of the first stimulus implicitly suggested target’s location. 
Congruent/incongruent refers to the correspondence between first stimulus and response. (b) Mean 
correct reaction times and standard errors (in milliseconds) for cued and uncued trials in congruent and 
incongruent conditions according to response (yes/no). It emerges an effect of priming due to first stimulus’ 
shape (congruent vs. incongruent condition). Spatial cueing produces a robust delay, especially in congruent 
trials. All conditions differ significantly (p < .05).
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had none or justified colour changes as a stratagem to contrast tediousness of trials’ repetition. However, 
to provide an objective measure of whether participants progressively learned the role of the cue, we 
explored how its effect varied during the experimental session. The difference (in ms) between cued and 
uncued trials (Δ cue) was compared across blocks by separate t-tests. No differences emerged: a stable, 
average difference of 32 ± 6 ms was found in each of the 6 blocks (all p > .05).
Discussion
The first stimulus caused both priming and cuing effects in the absence of overt knowledge that its 
colour acted as a spatial cue. These findings suggest that both cognitive and associative processes were 
at play. Although participants did not report active search for a rule, involvement of the cognitive sys-
tem is supported by the observation that responses to incongruent trials (i.e. trials in which the first 
shape triggered a different response code compared to the target) were significantly slower compared to 
responses in congruent trials (i.e. trials in which first shape and target shared the same response). This 
is a well-known effect that emerges when a stimulus (S) is paired with a particular response (R). Since 
the resulting S-R binding is retrieved automatically whenever that stimulus is encountered22–24, a certain 
degree of cognitive control is required to suppress unwanted responses21. This results in a correct but 
slower performance in incongruent trials, as was the case here.
On the other hand, involvement of associative processes is testified by the slowing down of RTs in 
cued trials. It could be speculated that this delay reflects the interaction between cognitive processes and 
associative mechanisms, in line with what suggested by previous studies. For example, in an artificial 
grammar-learning (AGL) task participants receiving explicit instructions about presence of a rule per-
formed more poorly compared to those tested in a fully-implicit learning condition25. Similarly, in SRT 
tasks if individuals receive the general instruction that stimuli are governed by a systematic pattern, their 
learning is affected, possibly due to the added computational burden derived from intentional search 
for rules26. However, a rule-seeking mechanism evoked by colour should have globally affected RTs, as 
uncued trials also included a coloured shape. Namely, the cue should have produced a null effect, with 
comparable RTs in the cued/uncued conditions. Conversely, and quite unexpectedly, the implicit cue 
produced a selective disadvantage, significantly slowing down RTs only in cued trials. This delay could be 
due to the interaction between on-going associative and cognitive processes. In fact, the task included a 
first stimulus to which participants should not respond: independently of whether it shared the shape of 
the target, participants had to exert control from the beginning of the trial to avoid an early response. In 
addition, in incongruent trials the effort of suppressing the primed response added to that of controlling 
the first stimulus. As a consequence, the executive system could not perform the anticipatory orienting of 
attention to the incoming target suggested by the cue. This would also explain why the delay imposed by 
the cue was reduced in incongruent trials, i.e. when controlling the response becomes more demanding, 
making the executive system less prone to the implicit association. We suggest that the observed delay 
could be considered as the result of a processing that develops serially (namely after that of the shape). 
Cued Uncued
Congruency x 
cuing
Congruency x 
response
Uncued-cued yes-no
yes no yes no diff. t diff. t
Experiment 1
Congruent 357 369 313 328 − 42 4.35* − 14 2.52*
13.78 10.46 5.41 7.07
Incongruent 699 667 673 652 − 21 3.82* 27 6.00*
14.92 13.74 17.85 17.47
Experiment 2
Congruent 435 436 312 318 − 121 5.86* − 3 − 1.47
21.96 19.67 6.54 6.60
Incongruent 779 759 712 692 − 67 5.42* 21 3.50*
20.08 21.19 10.89 13.18
Experiment 3
Congruent 313 338 445 490 142 10.49* − 36 6.21*
14.52 13.72 12.35 15.59
Incongruent 403 411 518 532 118 6.80* − 11 1.52
10.12 10.03 21.77 19.31
Table 1.  Mean Reaction Times (ms) and SE (in italics) for cued and uncued trials as a function 
of response (yes/no) and congruency between first shape and target (congruent = same shape; 
incongruent = different shape) in the three experiments. The two most rightward columns report the 
differences in ms between uncued/cued trials and yes/no responses, respectively. t values (df = 15) for the 
related comparisons are also reported; p values < .05 are identified by an asterisk (*).
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By the same token, the stable engagement of cognitive control may have prevented participants to con-
sciously recognize the rule linking colour to target location.
Albeit an explanation suggesting a trade-off between cognitive and associative mechanisms is appeal-
ing, the possibility for a more conservative interpretation cannot be ruled out. Here, the first stimulus 
had two visual features that included relevant information: shape (directly related to the response code) 
and colour (with its implicit predictive role). As both are conveyed through the visual modality, it is 
possible that the recorded delay reflects an overload of the visual working memory (WM) system. It has 
been observed that information that is incidental to the task is maintained in WM and may automat-
ically enter the focus of attention (FOA) if behaviourally relevant27. Here, colour of the first stimulus 
suggests target location: accordingly, one would assume it to be maintained in visual WM. However, due 
to the larger relevance of shape, information about colour could have been retrieved only after target’s 
appearance. Hence longer RTs in cued trials could reflect a tardive recognition of the association between 
colour and location (with location prompting colour, rather than the opposite). This in turn would pre-
vent the anticipatory orienting of attention allowing eventually for a confirmatory process28. While this 
mechanism still allows for the association to be created, it deprives the link from any predictive value, 
possibly explaining why participants remained unaware of the implicit rule. In uncued trials, for which 
no association exists between colour and target location, responses were faster as no extra-processing 
was required.
To falsify this hypothesis, in a second experiment we dissociated the sensory modalities through 
which prime and cue were presented. If the delay reported in cued trials reflects a visual overload, we 
expected the predictive value of the cue to be restored by using the visual modality for the prime and 
the acoustic one for the cue.
Experiment 2
Results. Sixteen new participants (mean age 25.88 ± 2.33yrs) were recruited. The task was identical to 
that of Exp.1 (see Fig. 1) except for the following: the first stimulus was monochromatic and appeared 
simultaneously with a tone whose pitch coded for target location in a similar way to colour in Exp.1. 
Namely, there were three different tones: two coded for one of the two lateral boxes, respectively; one 
allowed no prediction (see Fig. 3a).
As in Exp.1 responses were slower to ‘cued’ trials (602 ± 20.14 ms) than to ‘uncued’ trials (508 ± 6.76 ms), 
F(1,15) = 35.93, p = .0002, η p2 = .71. ‘No’ responses were faster (551 ± 12.8 ms) than ‘yes’ responses 
(560 ± 12.7 ms), F(1,15) = 10.01, p = .006, η p2 = .40; and RTs to ‘congruent’ trials (375 ± 11.35 ms) were 
shorter than those to ‘incongruent’ trials (736 ± 15.41 ms), F(1,15) = 1173.37, p = .0000001, η p2 = .99. 
Only the interaction Cue X Congruency was significant, F(1,15) = 33.60, p = .00003 η p2 = .69 (Fig.  3b, 
Table1). The difference between ‘cued’ and ‘uncued’ trials was larger in the congruent than in the incon-
gruent condition. Although results largely replicated those of Exp.1, in Exp.2 RTs were overall slower, 
F(1,30) = 9.18, p = .005, η p2 = .24. Specifically, here RTs to cued trials (but not to uncued ones) were 
significantly longer (Experiment x Cue, F(1,30) = 10.96, p = .002, η p2 = .27).
Figure 3. (a) In Exp. 2, in cued trials, the pitch of a tone coupled to the first stimulus implicitly suggested 
the location of the incoming target. As in Exp.1, congruent/incongruent refers to the correspondence 
between first stimulus and response. (b) Mean correct reaction times and standard errors (in milliseconds) 
for cued and uncued trials in congruent and incongruent conditions according to response (yes/no). An 
effect of response priming and a severe cue-dependent delay are detected. All conditions differ significantly 
(p < .05) except responses in congruent condition.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
6Scientific RepoRts | 5:16156 | DOi: 10.1038/srep16156
When debriefed, none of the participants reported the predictive nature of the first event. A stable, 
average Δ cue of 94 ± 8 ms was found in the 6 blocks. Separate t-tests confirmed that this value did not 
vary across blocks.
Discussion
Results of the second experiment replicated those of Exp.1. As in the previous case, the first shape 
induced priming effects. Also, participants remained unaware of the association linking the tone pitch 
associated to the first stimulus to target location. Crucially, a significant lengthening of RTs was again 
recorded in cued trials. The latter effect emerged even if prime and cue were conveyed through different 
sensory modalities, ruling out the possibility that the delay induced by the spatial cue reflects some form 
of overload.
It appears more likely that the inability to benefit from cuing relies on the interaction between cogni-
tive and associative mechanisms. However, compared to previous studies, which showed a non-specific 
disruption of associative mechanisms when propositional processes were at play25,26, here the task was 
not uniformly affected, as shown by the fact that uncued trials were not slowed down. To account for 
the present findings we hypothesize that the link between pitch and target location was detected but 
could not be used. A possible reason could be that the implicit spatial association is learnt across trials, 
while the link between first event and target (which includes the strong effect of the prime) is evident 
from the very beginning of the task, i.e. at a much earlier stage. The type of tasks applied here implies 
the repetitive execution of a sequence of operations. This creates a functional routine, also described as 
task-set29 that can be viewed as a cognitive module incorporating the perceptual and motor processes 
necessary to perform the task. Automatizing a sequence of operations has the ecological advantage of 
reducing involvement of the cognitive system, whose intervention can be limited to supervision of rou-
tines’ unfolding, task switching or response inhibition. Here, it is reasonable to assume that the operating 
routine is defined by a sequence including a first event, irrelevant to the response, followed by the target, 
whose shape is coupled with a response code. Only after several trials, the existence of an association 
between one characteristic of the first event and target location emerges. Namely, the existence of a 
regularity becomes available only once the response routine has been firmly established and is currently 
running. Although routines can be decomposed in functional subsets30, updating task-set information 
demands activation of control processes31–33 and reconfiguration of a routine may require re-activation of 
the running module33,34. In this view, the selective delay generated by spatial cuing could be ascribed to 
the impossibility of incorporating this newly acquired piece of information in the main routine. In this 
sense, the invariance of the delay across blocks (in both Exp.1 and 2) would be in line with the idea of the 
relative rigidity of the set of operations involved. Moreover, regularities, such as the association between 
first event and target location, have strong predictive capabilities and represent by themselves salient 
information9,35, unlikely to be easily ignored. Similarly to Exp.1, we assume that the delay in responding 
to cued targets could then reflect the time required to serially process this information. In this view, it 
could be hypothesized that if information conveyed by the spatial cue were made available at an earlier 
stage, its predictive value would be restored allowing for target’s anticipation. To test this hypothesis, we 
replicated the first experiment coupling a neutral tone to the first event in order to increase its saliency 
through multisensory integration processes36.
Experiment 3
Results. A third group of sixteen participants (22.63 ± 1.63yrs) was involved. The task was identical 
to that of Exp.1 (i.e. colour of the first shape implicitly cued for target location, see Fig. 1) but here the 
first shape was paired to a neutral tone (see Fig 4a).
As in the previous two experiments, the main effect of cueing was significant (Fig. 4b), F(1,15) = 85.21, 
p = .00001, η p2  = .85. However, here responses to ‘cued’ trials (366 ± 10–48 ms) were faster than those 
to ‘uncued’ trials (496 ± 14.26 ms). ‘Yes’ responses (420 ± 10.73 ms) were faster than ‘no’ responses 
(442 ± 10.81 ms), F(1,15) = 14.15, p = .001, η p2 = .48. RTs were faster in ‘congruent’ (396 ± 11.67 ms) 
than in ‘incongruent’ condition (466 ± 13.51 ms), F(1,15) = 22.92, p = .0005, η p2 = .60. Two interac-
tions were significant: Cueing X Congruency F(1,15) = 8.45, p = .01, η p2 = .36; Congruency X Response, 
F(1,15) = 30.31, p < .003, η p2 = .67. The difference between ‘cued’ and ‘uncued’ trials was larger in the 
congruent than in the incongruent condition. ‘Yes’ responses were faster than ‘no’ responses only in 
congruent trials (see Table 1). In addition to the reversed effect of the cue, compared to Exp.1, here RTs 
were globally faster (F(1,30) = 34.13, p = 000002, η p2 = .54). This was specifically due to RTs to cued 
trials, Experiment x Cue interaction, F(1,29) = 97.53, p = 0000001, η p2 = .76. The effect of the prime also 
differed, RTs to incongruent trials becoming faster in Exp.3 (Experiment x Congruency, F(1,29) = 101,58, 
p = 0000001, η p2 = .77).
None of the participants was aware of the predictive nature of the first event. However, here Δ cue 
increased from − 11 ms in block1 to − 113 ms in block2 and − 187 ms in block6. Separate t-tests showed 
significant differences between block1 and 2 (p < .0006) and block4 and 5 (p < .0005).
Discussion. The main finding of Exp.3 is that the pattern of results produced by the spatial cue was 
completely reversed since spatial cuing produced a significant advantage. This finding indicates the 
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implicit information linking colour to target location was not only detected, but also proficiently used. 
Besides, shape priming was markedly reduced.
The tone being the only difference compared to Exp.1, we assume that its presence affected the whole 
organization of cognitive operations involved in the task. It has been shown that in visual search tasks, 
non-spatial auditory signals favour processing of visual features by affecting selection priority, a phe-
nomenon which is assumed to occur relatively early in the perceptual process36. In a similar way here 
we assume that the addition of the neutral tone allowed all perceptual attributes of the first event to be 
immediately included in the task operational routine. Furthermore, recent results show that bimodal 
attentional templates can be created that include both visual and auditory features: so, selective atten-
tional processing would not be guided exclusively by visual target-defining features37. Accordingly, com-
pared to Exp.1, here factors independent from the intrinsic features of the prime (e.g. the tone) were 
likely drawn in. Cognitive control was thus exerted earlier against a multimodal distractor rather than 
being elicited by a shape that may be relevant to the response. This possibility is supported by the obser-
vation that – compared to Exp.1 – the effect of the prime was significantly reduced (see Fig. 4b).
The different, less effortful, involvement of cognitive control we hypothesize had a number of impor-
tant consequences: orienting processes could anticipate target location; responses were faster in all con-
ditions, suggesting a more efficiently paced sequence of operations; a practice effect was observed, with 
cuing speeding up responses not only from block1 to block2, but up to block5.
General Discussion
In three experiments, we explored the behavioural effects of providing participants with both explicit 
instructions and implicit information about the task. To assess whether recruitment of cognitive pro-
cesses interacts with automaticity of associative mechanisms, we included the incidental information 
that the target would be preceded by another stimulus. The latter played the double role of prime (i.e. 
its shape was relevant to the response processing) and (hidden) spatial cue. Participants never explicitly 
detected that the first event acted as a cue to target location, even if the ambiguous instruction could have 
favoured intentional rule-seeking26. Nevertheless, in all experiments the cue selectively altered responses, 
either by lengthening (in Exp.1 and 2) or speeding up RTs to cued trials (in Exp.3). This implies that 
embedded information – if relevant to the task – never went amiss, albeit its exploitation varied across 
experiments. Specifically, even if associative processes can work in the background, i.e. independently 
from cognitive ones, the opportunity to benefit from implicitly learnt information was influenced by 
when and how cognitive control was engaged.
The fact that an effect of the cue was always found would be in agreement with the ecological advan-
tage offered by detecting regularities and/or causal relationships among events. Information that can 
be predicted is processed faster and reduces the computational burden of the brain, allowing for more 
cognitive resources to be devoted to processing novel information and, eventually, to creating new asso-
ciations. Indeed, it has been shown that individuals search for patterns even when this behaviour is 
entirely useless, either because there are no regularities or, if present, they bring no advantage or even 
interfere with performance38–40. With respect to the latter, studies on AGL and SRT tasks25,26 have shown 
Figure 4. (a) In Exp. 3, in all trials the first stimulus was always coupled to a neutral tone (a beep). As 
in Exp.1, first stimulus’ colour implicitly cued for target’s location. (b) Mean correct reaction times and 
standard errors (in milliseconds) for cued and uncued trials in congruent and incongruent conditions 
according to response (yes/no). Here spatial cueing allows for a successful anticipation of the target and RTs 
in cued trials are significantly faster. Only a moderate effect of response priming is present. All conditions 
differ significantly (p < .05) except responses in the incongruent condition.
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that providing participants with the information that a rule exists in a seemingly random pattern affects 
associative learning. In the present study, a lengthening of RTs to cued trials was observed only in Exp.1 
and 2, suggesting that an explanation in terms of intentional rule seeking would not entirely account for 
the participants’ inability to take advantage of the cue. This specificity, together with the relative inde-
pendence of the interference from the sensory modality involved (color in Exp.1, tone pitch in Exp.2) 
rather seems to describe a more complex form of interaction.
We suggest that the differential response to cuing depends on when and how cognitive control is 
engaged by the task. In all experiments, the implicit spatial association is learnt across trials. Conversely, 
the link between first event and target shape is available at a much earlier stage (tapping directly from the 
explicit instruction) and – by acting on the response – it carries meaningful information. In Exp.1 and 
2, this organisation may have selectively delayed cued trials. Indeed, the need to control for the effects of 
the prime is likely to have induced a strong engagement of cognitive processes. As a consequence, when 
the association between colour/tone pitch and target location was established, the demanding process 
of incorporating this information in the task-set29 could not be performed. The paradoxical lengthening 
of RTs would thus reflect the time required to serially process the however useful implicit information 
carried by the cue. Alternatively, it could be speculated that the association was made between target 
location and cue, rather than the opposite, depriving the latter of its predictive role. In this view it is 
unsurprising that the regularity failed to reach consciousness: both accounts imply that attention could 
not anticipate target location. However, it remains that in Exp.1 and 2 the meaningful role of the cue 
was somewhat detected: to our knowledge, this is the first report showing a selective delay generated by 
a 100% valid implicit spatial cuing. In Exp.3, by increasing saliency of the first event, i) all features of 
the first stimulus became simultaneously relevant (i.e. participants likely viewed a “red club” rather than 
“club”+ “red”) and/or ii) cognitive control was differently engaged, as shown by the fact that orienting 
processes took place, i.e. in this condition the spatial cue was both detected and used. However, as in 
the previous experiments, participants remained unaware of the implicit mechanism. We can speculate 
that this lack of awareness could depend on the fact that the cue predicted location and was thus only 
indirectly linked to the response in all conditions.
Taken together, results from the three experiments support the idea that cognitive control and associ-
ative learning mechanisms functionally co-exist and interact. As suggested by previous studies18,41, asso-
ciative processes were active “in the background” all through the experiments. Depending on when and 
how cognitive control intervenes, associative mechanisms allowed only for detection of the association or 
for its detection and use to anticipate the next event. This functional dissociation suggests that the ability 
to recognize regularities in the environment does not rely on the same mechanisms involved in applying 
this implicit knowledge. Albeit neuroanatomical speculations are beyond the scope of the present work, 
this finding is in line with studies showing that distinct neural networks are involved when using already 
implemented stimulus-response associations or simply instructed ones42, and also in representing newly 
instructed information about stimulus-response mappings as opposed to their actual utilization43.
Methods
Participants. Three groups of 16 healthy individuals (8 women) participated to the study (mean age, 
Exp.1: 23.06 ± 1.53yrs; Exp. 2: 25.88 ± 2.33yrs; Exp. 3: 22.63 ± 1.63yrs). All were naive as to the purpose 
of the experiments, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and did not suffer from deafness or col-
our-blindness. Before entering the experimental session all participants signed informed consent. The 
study was conducted in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the ethical 
committee of the Department of Psychology of the University of Rome “La Sapienza”.
Experiment 1
Stimuli. Participants rested their head on a chin-rest in front of a 24” BenQ VA LED monitor 
(1920× 1080, Tr 8 ms, refresh rate 60Hz) located at a 50-cm viewing distance. A central fixation marker 
“+ ” (.41° by .41° wide) was presented at the centre of the screen (Fig. 1). The baseline-display consisted 
of three boxes (3° wide, 2° eccentricity from each other). First stimulus and target were coloured shapes 
(1.3° wide) depicting a heart, spade or club appearing in one of the boxes. The red/green/blue (RGB) 
values for the colours were 0,0,255 (blue); 0,255,0 (green); 255,0,0 (red). Stimuli appeared on a grey 
background (RGB, 180,180,180).
Procedure. Participants had to maintain fixation and respond to target shape by pressing as fast as 
possible one of two vertically aligned keys (response/key correspondence was balanced between subjects). 
The question “Is the target a club (heart/spade)”? was posed before each block of trials. Instructions 
explicitly stated that the target was the second stimulus. All trials had the same structure (see Fig.  1), 
starting with the central cross (150 ms), followed by a 500 ms blank, and three boxes. After 500 ms 
the first stimulus appeared in the central box for 150 ms. Following an 350–700 ms interval, the target 
appeared for 150 ms in one of the two lateral boxes. All boxes disappeared after participant’s response 
or 1500 ms. Inter-trial interval varied between 450–550 ms. All intervals were randomly chosen from a 
discrete number of values. Participants were asked to avoid eye movements after disappearance of the 
cross. A JVC-TK240 camera mounted on the computer screen allowed one experimenter to verify that 
they complied with this instruction.
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Colour of the first stimulus cued the box where the target would appear. There were three colours, 
two cueing for either lateral box, one favouring none (i.e., target appearing with 50% probability in either 
lateral box; e.g., blue = left box, red = right box, green = right or left box) (see Fig. 2a). Target and first 
stimulus always shared the same colour.
1152 trials were presented (in 6 separated blocks of 192 trials each): half of them included a spatially 
informative cue. Expected response was ‘yes’ in half of the trials. Target shape (heart/club) and colour 
by side coupling were balanced between subjects. Order of presentation of trial types, cued side, and 
stimulus-target congruency according to response was randomized in each sequence and across partic-
ipants. Each block lasted approx. 10min. Participants were free to take a brief pause at the end of each 
block. The whole experiment lasted about 60–75 min. Before starting the experiment, a training session 
of 10 trials was run to familiarize participants with the task.
A short interview (debriefing) was run at the end of the experiment in which participants were asked 
whether they had any special remark to make about the task (e.g. relating to trials difference in difficulty, 
stimuli’s features, response accuracy/speed).
Experiment 2
Stimuli and procedure were identical to those of Exp.1 except for the following: the first stimulus was 
monochromatic and appeared simultaneously with a tone whose pitch coded for target location in a 
similar way to colour in Exp.1: high/medium/low pitch coding for right, left, or both lateral boxes with 
equal probability, respectively (see Fig.  3a). Tones were delivered through earphones and were 150 ms 
square-waves synchronized with first stimulus’ onset. The low/middle/high-pitched tones were of 
362/547/732 Hz, respectively.
Experiment 3
Stimuli and procedure were identical to those of Exp.1 except for the following: the first stimulus was 
paired to a neutral tone. The tone was delivered through earphones and was a 150 ms square-wave syn-
chronized with first stimulus’ onset. A single 500-Hz tone was used.
Data Analysis. Mean Reaction Times (RTs) for correct responses for each condition were computed. 
Less than 2% of trials were discarded due to anticipation (response faster than 100 ms), misses (no 
key-press or response slower than 1500 ms), errors or eye movements. Means and standard errors (SE) 
are provided in the Results section. For each experiment, RTs were submitted to a 2×2× 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA with cueing (cued/uncued), congruency between first stimulus and target according 
to response (congruent/incongruent) and response (yes/no) as within-subject factors. Separate t-tests 
(one-tailed) were run to compare differences between cued/uncued trials and yes/no responses in the 
different conditions. In addition, two separate ANOVAs with Experiment as between subject factor and 
Cue, Congruency and Response as within subject factors were ran to compare Exp.1 vs. Exp.2 and 
Exp.1 vs. Exp.3, respectively. For the sake of brevity, only results related to the main topic of the study 
(i.e. implicit cuing and priming effects) are reported in the text. Finally, to assess whether and how the 
observed effects varied across blocks we computed the difference (in  ms) between cued and uncued 
trials (Δ cue) and run separate t-tests across blocks for each experiment.
Alpha level was set at .05 for all tests. Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons were applied 
when appropriate. Prior to running the ANOVAs, normal distribution of the responses was assessed 
for each group of participants via Shapiro-Wilk W test. For Exp.2 in which data distribution was not 
normal (W = .83, p = .007), RTs were submitted to logarithmic transformation prior to being entered in 
the ANOVA. Comparison between results of Exp.1 and 2 was also performed on log transformed data.
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